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INCENTIVIZING MUNICIPALITIES TO 
ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE: TAKINGS 
LIABILITY AND FEMA REFORM AS 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
DAVID DANA* 
Abstract: This Article addresses a central question of climate adaptation in 
the United States: how can municipalities, which are best positioned to take a 
lead in climate change adaptation efforts, be incentivized to do so? The Article 
analyzes and ultimately rejects as doctrinally unmoored and counterproduc-
tive one idea that has been suggested by commentators and arguably endorsed 
in a few noteworthy recent cases—that is, that municipalities and other gov-
ernments be held liable under the Takings Clause for their failing to take adap-
tive measures that protect private property. Instead, the Article argues that 
municipalities should be given an incentive to adapt by means of modifica-
tions in federal aid programs that in effect would require the municipalities to 
obtain private insurance against climate-change-related damage to public 
property and infrastructure. This proposal, if adopted, would be a salient first 
step toward the transformation of federal policy from one that actively dis-
courages private adaptation to changing patterns of extreme weather and sea 
level rise to one that actively encourages such adaptation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Municipalities and other local governments will be central to how well, 
or not well, the United States adapts to climate change and its attendant in-
crease in extreme weather, change in sea level, and flooding.1 Given the very 
strong tradition of localism in the United States, and the need for adaptation 
to be tailored to conditions on the ground, an effective adaptation regime will 
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 1 For a succinct summary of climate change effects in the Unites States, see Future Climate 
Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/science/future.html [https://
perma.cc/532T-VCZP] (stating that there is abundant evidence that sea level rise related to climate 
change will cause substantial flooding in parts of the coastal United States). Climate change is also 
associated with drought, extreme weather, and increased damage from wind and storm-related 
flooding. Id. See generally Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed, 73 LA. L. REV. 69 (2012) (sum-
marizing sea level rise and its legal implications). 
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require municipalities to make climate-change-sensitive decisions informed 
by the best available information regarding how climate change has and will 
alter weather patterns, sea level, and risk of fire.2 
Some municipalities like New York City have taken a leadership role 
with respect to climate change.3 But that is only a partial picture.4 Other 
municipalities have not taken efforts to adapt to climate change, or have not 
taken as extensive efforts as would be possible.5 So one relevant question 
becomes: how can municipalities that have not taken adequate measures to 
address risks from flood, wind, storm, and fire associated with climate 
change be incentivized to do so? 
This Article considers two possible ways to incentivize otherwise re-
luctant municipalities: (1) Takings Clause liability for a municipality that 
takes no, inadequate, or ineffective measures to protect private property 
from sea level rise, flood, wind, storm, and fire damage that is anticipated to 
be part of climate change, and (2) enhanced incentives for municipalities to 
carry private insurance against flood, wind, and storm damage to municipal 
property and infrastructure, perhaps in the form of an outright mandate, or 
more realistically, as an absolute condition on the receipt of federal aid.6 
Although the Takings Clause solution finds some support in recent 
scholarship and case law, that solution is undesirable, both because it is doc-
trinally problematic and because it could create perverse incentives for mu-
nicipalities to favor highly engineered but less effective forms of adaptation 
and channel the risks of climate change onto the most vulnerable popula-
tions.7 It could also create perverse incentives for property owners to forego 
adapting to climate change risks.8 Climatic takings liability is neither doc-
                                                                                                                           
 2 On the large local role in adaptation generally and especially in the United States context, 
see Thomas M. Gremillion, Setting the Foundation: Climate Change Adaptation at the Local 
Level, 41 ENVTL. L. 1221 (2011) and TERRI L. CRUCE, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
ADAPTATION PLANNING—WHAT STATES AND LOCALITIES ARE DOING 1 (2009), http://www.2es.
org/docUploads/state-adapation-planning-august-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/4338-SEUT]. 
 3 The Challenges We Face: Climate Change, N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/sustainability/climate-change.shtml [https://perma.cc/NR28-
NHWQ]. 
 4 Andrew Keatts, Cities Focus on Mitigating Climate Change, Fail to Adapt, GOVTECH.COM 
(Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/Cities-Focus-on-Mitigating-Climate-Change-
Fail-to-Adapt.html [https://perma.cc/68X8-4VVK]. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See infra notes 68–189 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 
113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 400–01 (2014) (expressing the related but different concern that the bene-
ficiaries of passive takings would be wealthy owners who live by the sea and have the resources 
and sophistication to bring takings claims). 
 8 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., FEMA’S PROCESS FOR TRACKING 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 1 (2011), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/
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trinally sound nor good policy from the perspective of incentivizing adapta-
tion.9 
By contrast, incentivizing municipalities to carry private insurance 
with respect to climate-related damage to public property and infrastructure 
could have a number of salutary effects: bringing third-party insurers in as 
de facto pro-adaptation regulators, sensitizing municipal leaders to climate 
change risks they otherwise might be motivated to ignore, and raising the 
costs of new development in those areas most susceptible to flooding and 
storm damage. Private insurance may lead to more adaptive building, re-
building, and planning, and (in places) the retreat from flood-prone areas 
that climate change arguably calls for, at least from an overall social welfare 
perspective.10 
The current federal regime does not merely fail to incentivize localities 
to carry adequate private insurance for risks related to climate change.11 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) disaster aid is configured 
in such a way as to affirmatively disincentivize localities to obtain insur-
ance.12 This disincentive should be removed. 
For third-party private insurance of municipalities in areas subject to 
flooding and other climate-related risks to be economically-viable, the pool 
of insureds cannot be limited to those municipalities at the greatest risk. If 
that were the case, insurers either will not enter the market or will soon exit 
it. Thus, a reasonably broad pool of municipalities must be incentivized to 
purchase insurance. Insurers’ incentives to promote climate change adapta-
tion also would be enhanced if state insurance law permitted, and the appli-
cable federal incentive policy required, that flood insurance policies be is-
sued on a five-year, ten-year, or longer basis. The largest obstacles to mak-
ing the required changes in federal and state law will be ones of political 
economy and political will. 
Because de jure mandatory or de facto mandatory insurance raises 
problems of affordability for less wealthy municipalities, some form of fed-
                                                                                                                           
OIG_12-18_Dec11.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D85-8SWN] (addressing the concern that FEMA aid 
will duplicate private insurance, which could discourage adaptation). 
 9 See infra notes 68–109 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 110–189 and accompanying text. The topic of municipalities, climate change 
adaptation, and insurance has not received substantial attention in the academic literature. The most 
extensive analysis of the topic is an unpublished paper from the Emmet Center. RICHARD LOU ET AL., 
HARVARD L. SCH. EMMETT ENVTL. L. & POL’Y CTR., MUNICIPAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
AND THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY (2012), http://blogs.harvard.edu/environmentallawprogram/files/
2013/10/Municipal-CC-Adaptation-and-Insurance-Industry_FINAL_revised-10-2-13.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R82U-PGTD]. 
 11 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 8, at 1. 
 12 Id. 
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eral government subsidies or support might be necessary, both as a matter of 
fairness and as a matter of political reality, even though such subsidies cer-
tainly are in tension with the goal of using insurance to motivate adaptation. 
Moreover, federal reinsurance guarantees may be needed to address private 
insurers’ concerns about huge claims attached to Katrina-like storm activi-
ty.13The federal expenditures on insurance premium subsidies or reinsur-
ance guarantees, however, would generate greater social welfare return than 
the current pattern of federal expenditures, which consists of ex post emer-
gency aid and reconstruction funds that are provided whether or not munic-
ipalities have adequately sought to limit risk. 
This Article does not address the question of incentivizing individual 
landowners and investors in particular localities, which has been much dis-
cussed in the context of calls for reform in federal and state flood insurance 
programs that (it is universally agreed) charge too low premiums and thus 
discourage adaptation.14 The focus here on municipalities and hence munic-
ipal officials is justified in part because the role of federal law in failing to 
incentivize or actually disincentivizing their adaptation decisions has re-
ceived comparatively less attention than the role of the federal government 
in disincentivizing individual property owners’ adaptation via excessively 
cheap, government-operated insurance. But, of course, in order to move to a 
reasonably adaptive regime on the part of municipal officials, the incentives 
of individual property owners and investors must be addressed because, via 
local politics, individual property owners indisputably have a very large 
influence over the decisions of local officials. 
Part I provides the legal background for the Takings Clause liability 
approach, describing recent scholarship and recent case law, such as Arkan-
sas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. 
United States, Quebedeaux v. United States, and St. Bernard Parish v. Unit-
                                                                                                                           
 13 Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, Environment & Energy: Catastrophic Liabilities, in 
MEASURING AND MANAGING FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK 235, 235–45 (Deborah Lucas ed., 2007) 
(discussing the impact from large claims on private insurer profitability). 
 14 See Howard Kunreuther, Reflections on U.S. Disaster Policy for the 21st Century 1, 8–9 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12449, 2006), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w12449.pdf [https://perma.cc/24QW-DLEU] (explaining that the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram offers subsidized insurance rates for residents living in hazard zones and arguing for a risk-
based approach to flood insurance). For other critiques of government-subsidized flood insurance, 
see Ernest Abbott, Flood Insurance and Climate Change, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10 
(2014), Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 
3–5 (U. Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 111, 2015), http://repository.
law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1221&context=law_econ_current [https://perma.cc/
H7CE-6VRU], and Jennifer Wriggins, Flood Money: The Challenge of U.S. Flood Insurance 
Reform in a Warming World, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 361 (2014). 
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ed States that would seem to provide a basis for that approach.15 Part II ex-
plains why the various possible climatic takings claims are problematic in 
terms of both government and private property owner incentives.16 Part III 
explains why the current post-natural disaster federal aid regime creates 
perverse incentives for municipalities to forego adequately insuring against 
flooding and other effects that may be tied to climate change.17 It sketches 
options for reform and then considers objections to an approach to incentiv-
izing adaptation by localities that relies on the greater use of private insur-
ance. 
I. THE BACKGROUND LAW AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TAKINGS 
One way to conceptualize the Takings Clause is as a liability provision. 
And one function of liability—or the possibility of liability—is to incentiv-
ize socially desirable conduct or disincentive socially undesirable conduct.18 
For example, we hold builders liable for construction defects in part be-
cause we want to incentivize them to build safely.19 Similarly, in theory 
(although perhaps not in reality, as discussed below), one can imagine that 
Taking Clause liability for the loss of private property via climate-change-
related sea level rise, flood, wind, fire, and such could motivate government 
actors to take actions to avoid or minimize the possibility of such property 
losses.20 
But what, exactly, would takings claims against government actors re-
lated to weather patterns, sea level rise, flood, wind, and fire look like? 
There are at least four distinct categories of claims, each of which, ex ante, 
could incentivize somewhat different behavior on the part of government 
actors: 
• Inaction Claims: Takings claims against governments for failing to 
take action to adapt to climate change. 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 511 (2012); St. Bernard Parish 
v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015); Quebedeaux v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 317 (2013); 
Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48 (2012); infra notes 18–67 and accompany-
ing text. 
 16 See infra notes 68–109 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 110–189 and accompanying text. 
 18 For discussions of the Takings Clause emphasizing its role in terms of investment incen-
tives, see Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic 
Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984), Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should 
Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984), and David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and 
the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 655 (1995). 
 19 See Acosta v. Glenfed Dev. Corp., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 20 See infra notes 68–109 and accompanying text. 
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• Ineffective Action: Takings claims against governments for taking 
adaptive actions that were insufficient to prevent property loss. 
• Counterproductive Action: Takings claims against governments for 
taking action that not only was ineffective in preventing property loss, 
but also caused greater losses than otherwise would have occurred. 
• Improper Diversion: Takings claims against governments for diverting 
the effects of climate change, such as flooding or fire, from one ar-
ea/community to another, such that the latter area/community incurred 
greater property losses than it otherwise would have incurred, although 
the former area/community incurred less loss then it otherwise would 
have. 
At first blush, none of these claims would seem to fit the traditional 
paradigm of the Takings Clause, wherein the government is held liable for 
directly causing a loss of property that otherwise would not have hap-
pened.21 Takings Clause jurisprudence requires the government to be both 
the but-for and the proximate cause of the property loss, but the claims out-
lined above do not comport with that causation requirement.22 Govern-
ments—in any case particular local governments—do not cause extreme 
weather and sea level rise associated (or not) with climate change.23 Gov-
ernments do not singularly cause people to invest in areas at risk from cli-
mate-change-related flooding or other risks. Governments are not usually 
held liable for trying, but not fully solving, a problem they did not directly 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 22 Jan G. Laitos & Theresa H. Abel, The Role of Causation When Determining the Proper 
Defendant in a Takings Lawsuit, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1181, 1236, 1238 (2012) (noting 
that although the courts have not explained at great length or with great clarity the causation re-
quirement for takings claims, reviewing courts in takings cases should first “determine whether 
the government-defendant is the factual and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s alleged harm”); see 
also Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (referring to losses 
“proximately caused” by government as subject of Takings Clause liability); Christy v. Hodel, 857 
F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that takings involve more than just the incidental result 
of regulation); Akins v. California, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that 
owner must show a substantial cause and-effect relationship between government and the injury). 
Another case, Bowditch v. Boston, can be understood as a seminal proximate causation case about 
when the government should and should not be held liable for a taking in a disaster setting. 101 
U.S. 16, 18–20 (1879). In Bowditch, although the city workers damaging property as part of a fire 
containment effort were the but-for cause of the damage, they were not the proximate cause, as it 
was the fire (and whoever set or caused the fire) that compelled the fire containment effort. Id.; 
see also Nicholson v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 605, 619–20 (2007) (dismissing takings claim 
related to Katrina flooding where the plaintiffs did not allege an affirmative action by the govern-
ment that caused the flooding). 
 23 See Laitos & Abel, supra note 22, at 1182–83, 1238 (stating that to be responsible, the 
harm must be shown to be an “objectively foreseeable consequence of the initial act that eventual-
ly resulted in the harm”). 
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cause: we would not imagine that a city would be held liable for burglaries 
it sought to prevent, but did not prevent, through policing.24 
In the counterproductive action and improper diversion scenarios, the 
government arguably is a more active, more directly causal actor, in the 
property loss resulting from sea level rise or flooding or other climate-
related phenomena, but even in these scenarios, the government is merely 
endeavoring to protect property and (perhaps) life against a force—climate 
change and its effects—that are not directly of the government’s making. 
Nonetheless, even if holding governments liable for not doing enough 
or not doing the right things to address climate change effects seems to 
stretch our traditional notions of causal responsibility for takings purposes, 
it is not unprecedented in our overall legal tradition for liability to be im-
posed for not preventing harm as opposed to directly causing harm.25 Our 
overall legal tradition is complex and not particularly consistent on the 
question of causal responsibility. This point is the beginning point of the 
passive takings argument put forth by Christopher Serkin, Associate Dean 
for Research and Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School in a powerful 
and nuanced article arguing that the government’s failure to act sometimes 
should give rise to liability under the Takings Clause for property losses the 
government did not but could have prevented.26 
Professor Serkin’s argument is partly based on doctrinal consistency—
on the idea that Takings Clause liability based on inaction is consistent with 
liability imposed in other non-takings contexts for inaction—but he also ap-
pears to be arguing for passive takings in part out of a concern for incentiviz-
ing governments to take adequate action to adapt to phenomena such as cli-
mate change.27 Climate change, and in particular sea level rise, is one of Ser-
kin’s central examples.28 And Serkin suggests what is in a way an appealing 
“what’s good for the goose is good for the gander” argument for the climate 
change context: since assertive government adaptation actions sometimes can 
result in Takings Clause liability (although the extent that is so or should be 
so is quite debatable), should not that disincentive to act be offset by an in-
centive to act in the form of potential Takings Clause liability for inaction or 
inadequate action?29 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Id. at 1210 (discussing the causation requirement for takings liability). 
 25 See Serkin, supra note 7, at 390 (describing government inaction as a basis for takings 
liability). 
 26 Id. at 346–49. 
 27 See id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 For arguments that affirmative government adaptation generally should not result in takings 
liability, see Robin Craig, What the Public Trust Doctrine Can Teach Us About the Police Power, 
Penn Central, and the Public Interest in Natural Resource Regulation: A Tribute to Joe Sax, 45 
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To his credit, Serkin recognizes and addresses many of the potential 
objections to passive takings and, in particular, the objection that once inac-
tion and inadequate action can be the basis for Takings Clause liability, 
governments might face an avalanche of litigation and liability that would 
overwhelm the courts and chill the operation of the executive and legisla-
tive branches.30 That is so because it is almost always possible to imagine 
some action the government did not take that could have prevented a given 
property loss.31 Given government’s broad powers, there is always some-
thing more, in theory, it could have done.32 Serkin tries to limit the govern-
ment’s obligation to act—and hence government liability for not acting—to 
contexts where the government had been heavily involved in the relevant 
regulatory and physical context affecting the property at issue, and thereby 
has implicitly assumed some measure of affirmative responsibility to act to 
protect the property’s value.33 
It is not at all clear, however, that there is a logical way to cabin liabil-
ity based on government inaction or inadequate action.34 In the modern era 
at least, government has so much background involvement in the economy 
that there are few, if any, domains in which it could not be argued that the 
government had implicitly assumed an obligation to act.35 In any case, in 
                                                                                                                           
ENVTL. L. 519, 519–59 (2015) and Sean Hecht, Taking Background Principle Seriously in the 
Context of Sea-Level Rise, 39 VT. L. REV. 781, 784–97 (2015). A similar argument to Serkin’s has 
been made by Jenna Shweitzer focusing on common law tort rather than takings liability. See 
Jenna Shweitzer, Climate Change Legal Remedies: Hurricane Sandy and New York City Coastal 
Adaptation, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 243, 291–93 (2014) (criticizing the lack of government tort liabil-
ity under current law for inadequate local adaptation and suggesting new legislation to create such 
liability to incentivize governmental adaptation efforts). Current tort doctrine shields the govern-
ment in most cases from negligence suits related to climate change adaptation. In theory, takings 
liability could be more problematic from the government’s perspective than tort liability because 
while tort liability would require a showing that the government acted unreasonably and hence 
negligently, takings liability would not necessarily be limited to scenarios in which the govern-
ment acted unreasonably. 
 30 Serkin, supra note 7, at 385–88. 
 31 Id. at 385. 
 32 Id. at 385–87. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 394–96. Serkin does suggest one demarcation line that would be relatively clear: that 
the government be held liable when it prohibits a property owner from engaging in self-help to 
protect his or her own property. See id. For example, when a government bars a property owner 
from constructing a sea wall on his or her own property, such self-help prohibitions are not pas-
sive takings at all—in those cases the government actively prohibits private action on private 
property, and indeed, such prohibitions have been the focus of many of the leading takings cases, 
including Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) and Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See id. 
 35 For example, the financial, banking, and housing markets are in large part government 
creations, and hence, under a passive takings theory, whenever the government does not act to 
prevent losses in those markets, it arguably could be held liable for having taken property. If one 
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the climate change context, there will never be a physical space where the 
government has not been highly involved, as a regulatory and physical mat-
ter. Virtually all of our rivers, oceans, and landscapes have been deeply af-
fected by government action, and in many cases, they have been completely 
engineered or re-engineered by governments, along with private actors. 
Some American cities were essentially swamps before major public fill pro-
jects.36 Governments have a long history of acting to control, manage, and 
direct flooding, including coastal flooding and storm-related flooding. Gov-
ernments have also been intimately involved in addressing fire risks, many 
of which involve government-owned land. Thus, even in those cases (if 
there are any) where governments very recently have been wholly inactive 
in addressing climate-related flooding or other climate-related effects, one 
can conceptually broaden the relevant time-frame and characterize the gov-
ernment as having been an active participant and hence (in Serkin’s concep-
tion) an actor that has assumed some obligation to take action to address 
climate change effects.37 
Moreover, given the political reality that governments almost always 
cannot afford to be seen as being wholly inactive with respect to risks such 
as flooding, even recent inaction on the part of governments almost always 
will be coupled with some recent action, even if only highly ineffective or 
perhaps symbolic action, to address the relevant risk. Thus, even if one can 
read Serkin’s analysis as (in my terms) suggesting liability only for ineffec-
tive action and not pure inaction regarding climate change, a passive takings 
approach, if seized upon by the courts, might produce very far-reaching lia-
bility.38 
                                                                                                                           
combines a relaxed conception of causal responsibility along the lines of passive takings and an 
expansive interpretation of “property” and property losses along the lines of Koontz, one could 
imagine an extremely expansive scope for takings liability that could in effect undo the post-
Lochner consensus that courts will not scrutinize and second-guess routine economic regulation. 
See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 U.S. 2586, 2603 (2013) (holding that the 
government can face takings liability for conditioning issuance of a permit to a landowner on the 
landowner providing money for projects on sites not owned by the landowners); Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45, 63–64 (1963) (holding that an economic regulation capping work hours inter-
fered with the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty); David A. Dana, Why Do We Have the 
Parcel-as-a-Whole Rule?, 39 VT. L. REV. 617, 641–45 (2015) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Koontz is doctrinally inconsistent with the principle of judicial deference to 
routine economic regulation). 
 36 See, e.g., Boston, Overview INDAGARE, http://www.indagare.com/destinations/north-america/
new-england/boston/ [https://perma.cc/J8P8-H2L3] (describing how Boston’s Back Bay neigh-
borhood was a swamp prior to a major fill project). 
 37 Serkin, supra note 7, at 361–63, 377–78. 
 38 Id. at 377–79. 
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Like Serkin’s passive takings, some recent cases arguably provide a 
basis for holding the government liable for taking property when it engages 
in inadequate, ineffective, counterproductive, or improper diversion re-
sponses to flooding and sea level rise.39 The most notable case in this regard 
grows out of the Hurricane Katrina disaster and the terrible flooding in the 
Lower Ninth Ward, in particular.40 The damage caused by Katrina certainly 
reflected a long pattern of ineffective and counterproductive adaptation on 
the part of the federal, state, and local governments, as well as private ac-
tors.41 The New Orleans landscape was transformed by public and private 
actors so that it was, and continues to be, highly vulnerable to flooding.42 
Well before Katrina, government actors knew of this vulnerability, as pre-
sumably did sophisticated private actors who continued to invest there any-
way.43 New Orleans is certainly a case of collective public and private fail-
ure, and it offers one of the more compelling cases one can imagine for the 
idea that the government, especially the federal government, should be held 
liable for ineffectively acting (and not acting at all) to address flooding risks 
that were well understood.44 
It is perhaps not surprising that the case that comes closest to endors-
ing a passive takings approach involved claims against the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) for having taken private properties 
in New Orleans via flooding during Katrina.45 In St. Bernard Parish v. 
United States, plaintiffs argued that the Corps had built a canal that added to 
flooding risks, and then did not take enough subsequent actions to address 
that flooding risk.46 In that sense, liability was predicated on government 
action coupled with inaction.47 The Court accepted the plaintiffs’ factual 
claim that the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (“MR-GO”), a deep channel 
authorized by Congress and built by the Corps to improve navigation, 
caused environmental damage and funneled storm surges such that the 
plaintiffs’ properties were inundated more than they would have been in the 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Dan Swenson, Anatomy of a Flood: How New Orleans Flooded During Hurricane 
Katrina, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2015/08/katrina_
flooding_map.html [https://perma.cc/7MKE-VVHM] (depicting the diversion of floodwaters from 
Hurricane Katrina). 
 40 Id. (depicting the flooding of the Lower Ninth Ward). 
 41 See Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5–30 (2006) (trac-
ing the history of environmental degradation in and around New Orleans). 
 42 See id. at 3 (describing insufficient and ineffective actions and programs that made New 
Orleans vulnerable to flooding). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See St. Bernard Parish v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 724–37, 746–47 (2015). 
 46 Id. at 724–37. 
 47 Id. 
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absence of the MR-GO, and that instead of closing the MR-GO and/or tak-
ing other actions to abate storm damage and flooding, the Corps did next to 
nothing.48 
But, as the United States argued in the litigation, the real problem with 
New Orleans at the time of Katrina was not the MR-GO per se, which was 
closed post-Katrina, but the fact that a range of actions over decades were 
not taken by the Corps, state and local governments, and private actors to 
address the risks of sea level rise and flooding notwithstanding a string of 
large pre-Katrina storms and reports stating that New Orleans was at risk.49 
The MR-GO was not the only canal or other force degrading the environ-
ment and making private property more susceptible to flooding.50 What ac-
tions that were taken on the part of government and private actors were far 
too little too late, not only with respect to the MR-GO, but also with respect 
to flood control systems and management as a whole.51 One could thus per-
haps read the Court’s imposition of takings liability as implicitly about not 
just the MR-GO, but also the need for the government, at least the federal 
government, to be held liable when it acts ineffectively or refuses to act to 
address a clear flooding risk, even when the risk has many causes other than 
direct government action.52 So read, St. Bernard Parish could be understood 
as endorsing not just a takings liability theory of (in my typology) counter-
productive action but also inaction and/or ineffective action.53 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 746–47. 
 49 Id. at 741. 
 50 Even the Claims Court acknowledged that “causation is complicated by the mix of natural 
and man-made contributions to the flooding that Plaintiffs experienced” and that “[m]any of the 
areas that were wooded lowlands in the 1950s and 1960s are now developed, leveed, and drained[, 
and], canals other than MR–GO have been used for navigation, as well as to install gas pipelines 
and access well heads.” Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See JENNIFER KLEIN, COLUMBIA LAW SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., PO-
TENTIAL LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS TO PREPARE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 25 (2015), http://web.
law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/klein_-_liability_of_governments_
for_failure_to_prepare_for_climate_change.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWX4-5DAT] (“Notably, Saint 
Bernard Parish, if it survives appeal, expands government liability from situations in which the 
government deliberately causes flooding, for example by releasing water from a dam, to include 
situations in which inaction by the government exacerbates flooding from severe weather . . . .”). 
A relatively recent Florida case could also be read as imposing takings liability for inaction. See 
Jordan v. St. Johns County, 63 So. 3d 835, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that a landown-
er had stated an inverse condemnation claim when the owner alleged that the locality failed to 
rebuild a public road washed away by erosion and storm damage such that the owner no longer 
had any ground access to its property). 
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There are several cases addressing what I called, in the typology 
above, improper diversion takings claims.54 These cases suggest a move 
toward a reduced causal requirement for takings liability, and hence are at 
least in the spirit of Serkin’s passive takings approach. The United States 
via the Corps of Engineers has been repeatedly sued by private property 
owners whose land has been flooded as a result of flows from Corps-
managed waters.55 Traditionally, the courts held that temporary flooding 
could not constitute a taking, presumably because temporary flooding was 
either unavoidable or part and parcel of the Corps trying to manage exces-
sive water flows during periods of heavy rains or some other external pres-
sure requiring a management response.56 Consistent with this traditional 
view, in Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court of 
Federal Claims found that the Corps had not taken flooded property when it 
flooded plaintiff’s farmland as part of an effort to save the town of Cairo, 
Illinois from flooding as the flood waters managed by the Corps surged in 
the wake of heavy rains.57 In effect, the Corps chose protecting a settlement 
over protecting essentially uninhabited farmland.58 
But then came Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States, 
a United States Supreme Court case that on its face seems quite innocuous, 
but that could be a building bridge to passive takings.59 In Arkansas Game, 
the Supreme Court held that temporary flooding caused by federal man-
agement that favored one set of property owners over another set could con-
stitute a taking if the flooding was foreseeable and exceeded the reasonable 
expectations of the landowners whose land was flooded.60 Such cases 
should be evaluated under the ad-hoc, multi-factor approach of Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Court advised.61 Following 
Arkansas Game, the plaintiff’s claims in Big Oak Farms, Inc. were reinstat-
ed.62 
Arkansas Game also played a central role in Quebedeaux v. United 
States, a case in which a class of property owners argued that the Corps 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 511, 518–23 (2012); Big Oak 
Farms, Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48, 55–59 (2012). 
 55 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S.Ct. at 518–21 (discussing some of these cases). 
 56 Big Oak Farms, Inc., 105 Fed. Cl. at 56. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 51, 55–56 (describing the “Jadwin Plan,” which diverted floodwaters to private farm-
land). 
 59 See 133 S.Ct. at 518–23. 
 60 Id. at 522–23. 
 61 See id. at 518. 
 62 Order Reinstating Plaintiffs’ Takings Claims at 1, Big Oak Farms, Inc., 105 Fed. Cl. 48 
(2012) (No. 11-275L), http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/conferences/2013/sites/default/files/down
loads_page/Big%20Oak%20Farms%20Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS3R-NQUA]. 
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took their property when the Corps diverted surging flood waters onto their 
farmland and other properties to reduce the risk of the levees in Baton 
Rouge and New Orleans from becoming overwhelmed and those major cit-
ies flooded.63 In refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims, the Federal 
Claims Court held that even a single, temporary flood could constitute a 
taking, depending on the “multi-factored, factually-intensive” analysis 
called for by Arkansas Game.64 
To be fair, none of these three cases—Arkansas Game, Big Oak Farms, 
Inc., or Quebedeaux—establish that governments will always be held liable 
as having taken property when they divert flood waters (or for that matter 
fires or ocean tides) away from one set of properties that would have been 
destroyed toward another set of properties as part of an effort to minimize the 
net social loss given the natural forces beyond the governments’ control.65 
But the cases certainly suggest that governments may well be held liable even 
in such cases of apparently reasonable government behavior. In other words, 
there is now substantial precedential support for improper diversion takings 
claims related to climate change.66 
Taken together, Serkin’s passive takings and Arkansas Game/Big Oak 
Farms, Inc./Quebedeaux provide some scholarly and case law support for 
the imposition of Takings Clause liability for inactive, ineffective, counter-
productive, and/or improper diversion takings claims related to flooding and 
sea level rise (and more generally related to climate change effects).67 These 
sources thus help frame the question: would the imposition of such liability 
result in better, more comprehensive climate change adaptation in the Unit-
ed States, and especially by local governments? As explained below, the 
answer seems to be likely not, and indeed quite the opposite may be true. 
II. GOVERNMENT ACTOR INCENTIVES, TAKINGS LIABILITY,  
AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
A. What Motivates Government and the Limited Impact of Uncertain Future 
Takings Liabilities 
As an initial matter, in asking the question of whether governments 
would act differently (and if differently, better or worse) if they faced Tak-
                                                                                                                           
 63 112 Fed. Cl. 317, 319–20 (2013). 
 64 Id. at 324–25. 
 65 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S.Ct. at 518–23; Quebedeaux, 112 Fed. Cl. at 324–25; 
Big Oak Farms, Inc., 105 Fed. Cl. at 55–59  
 66 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S.Ct. at 518–23; Quebedeaux, 112 Fed. Cl. at 324–25; 
Big Oak Farms, Inc., 105 Fed. Cl. at 55–59; Serkin, supra note 7, at 372–76. 
 67 See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S.Ct. at 518–23; Quebedeaux, 112 Fed. Cl. At 324–
25; Big Oak Farms, Inc., 105 Fed. Cl. at 55–59; Serkin, supra note 7, at 372–76. 
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ings Clause liability for doing too little by way of climate change adaptation 
or for diversions of floodwaters and tides from one area to another, it is 
necessary to ask: what motivates government actors who have control of 
decisions related to flooding and sea level rise and other climate-change 
risks? To be sure, there is unlikely to be a single answer to that question. In 
the United States, there will often be a large group of government actors 
from different governments that will play some role in the management and 
response to climate-related risks.68 The federal government, notably, but not 
exclusively through United States Army Corps of Engineers, plays a large 
role, as do state and local governments.69 Because climatic effects do not 
respect political boundary lines, a number of localities together may play a 
large role with respect to the relevant decisions in any particular geographic 
area.70 Thus, in considering how the possibility of takings liability will af-
fect government actors, a more refined inquiry compels us to ask: which 
government actors—and in what configuration—will be motivated by po-
tential liability for inadequate or ineffective or improper adaptation and 
how? 
The academic literature on the economics of takings liability provides 
a starting point but only a starting point.71 In one strand of the academic 
literature, the government and government actors are viewed as budget-
maximizers and expenditure-minimizers, in a way analogous to classical 
economics’ wealth-maximizing homo economicus.72 But recent commenta-
tors have questioned the robustness of this account of governmental motiva-
tions.73 As Daryl Levinson, Associate Professor at University of Virginia 
School of Law has powerfully argued, government actors—especially elect-
                                                                                                                           
 68 FRANK T. LITZ, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE 
DIALOGUE ON FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES IN U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 1 (2008), http://
www.c2es.org/docUploads/StateFedRoles.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6W7-TJ52]. 
 69 See id.; How Does Climate Change Affect USACE Mission Areas?, RESPONSES TO CLI-
MATE CHANGE (Jan. 14, 2013), http://corpsclimate.us/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/QA3B-QN3P]. 
 70 The fact that many governments—federal, state, and local—in some sense may have failed 
to adapt in any particular location poses another problem for takings lawsuits. Presumably, de-
fendants could sue a number of defendants, and the defendants could fight among themselves as to 
how to share any liability, but if liability were shared among many different governments, the ex 
ante incentive effects of such liability would be diluted. 
 71 See Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government Fiscally Blind? An 
Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement on Eminent Domain Exer-
cises, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–6 (forthcoming 2016) (working paper on file with author). 
 72 For a helpful summary of this view in the takings context, which often goes by the label of 
the “fiscal illusion” view, see id. at 2–4. 
 73 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Governments Pay: Markets, Politics and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 356–57 (2000); see also Nicole Garnett, The Ne-
glected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 142–43 (2006) (arguing 
that political rather than economic considerations can drive eminent domain choices). 
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ed ones but also ones reporting to or under the oversight of elected ones—
become such by gaining and maintaining political support, and are driven to 
keep that support to keep office.74 Thus, government actors may act, and 
demonstrably do act, in ways that do not minimize government expendi-
tures and may cost the government a great deal more than otherwise might 
be necessary when doing so maximizes political support.75 Moreover, in 
many contexts, government actors need not be directly concerned with lia-
bilities based on their actions because the liabilities will not necessarily 
come out of the budgets for which they are directly concerned.76 
As Professor Serkin has argued, however, small government localities 
and local officials may be more sensitive to financial liabilities than state or 
federal government actors.77 Smaller localities may feel that their overall 
budgets are constrained and have little slack. At the state and federal level, 
the overall budgets are larger and deficit spending is commonplace.78 For 
small governments, any new liabilities may require reductions in local ser-
vices that the populace regards as essential, such as schools and police, with 
tremendous political costs.79 It is thus arguable that local governments are not 
only sensitive to potential Takings Clause liabilities, but risk averse with re-
spect to such potential liabilities.80 
But what is missing in the academic literature is any discussion of the 
time-frame and level of uncertainty of any such takings liabilities, and how 
those factors influence the extent to which such potential liabilities will mo-
tivate conduct by local government officials. Local officials in small locali-
ties may be very attentive to or even averse to imminent, near-certain liabil-
ities, but not attentive to and certainly not risk averse to less immediate, 
quite uncertain liabilities. Human beings, of which government officials are 
a subset, and of which the electorate they must serve and please are another 
subset, discount costs that may be incurred in the future as opposed to those 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Levinson, supra note 73, at 356–57. 
 75 See id. (contrasting government with a private, profit-maximizing business). 
 76 Id. at 354; see 31 U.S.C. § 3104 (2012); INDEP. INST., PROPERTY RIGHTS: EMINENT DO-
MAIN AND REGULATORY TAKINGS RE-EXAMINED 203 (Bruce L. Benson ed., 2010) (discussing 
how takings judgments against the United States are paid out of the Federal Judgment Fund, rather 
than particular agency budgets). 
 77 See Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and 
the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1645–52 (discussing how at the local government 
level, decision-makers internalize, to a greater extent than at other levels, the costs of their deci-
sions). 
 78 Id. at 1667. 
 79 Id. at 1695–96. 
 80 See id. at 1666–74; see also Christopher Serkin, Strategic Land Use Litigation: Pleading 
Around Municipal Insurance, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 463, 475–76 (2016). 
296 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:281 
that are immediate or nearly so.81 Discount rates vary.82 Politicians may dis-
count future costs in a particularly dramatic fashion because they may be 
especially attentive to what will happen on their watch and quite willing to 
pass possible future problems to the next generation of leaders.83 
Discounting may be particularly dramatic when the choice political 
leaders face is between bearing certain financial costs now with accompa-
nying political costs—as, for example, the costs of cutting funding for a 
popular program—and the uncertainty that the locality will bear a liability 
at some point in the future if it does not expend the funds now used on the 
popular program to boost climate change adaptation.84 A strong body of 
psychological scholarship supports the view that people tend to overweigh 
the avoidance of certain costs as compared to the avoidance of uncertain, 
albeit much larger, costs.85 And, to be sure, there are numerous examples of 
governments, local and others, apparently putting off problems and poten-
tial liabilities to a future day out of an unwillingness to bear certain costs 
now.86 In many states and localities, for example, local officials have re-
fused to make spending cuts and impose taxes even though doing so has 
exposed their states and localities to millions or even billions of dollars in 
possible unfunded liabilities for public employee pensions.87 
None of this is to suggest that possible takings liability, even whether 
and when (if ever) the liabilities will be incurred is very uncertain, cannot 
motivate government behavior. But the more uncertain the timing and actu-
al imposition of such liability is, the less that the threat of liability is likely 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See ALAN M. JACOBS, GOVERNING FOR THE LONG TERM: DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS 
OF INVESTMENT 28 (2011) (“One common view of democratic politics suggests both a clear predic-
tion of policy myopia and a clear explanation of it. Office-seeking politicians, in this view, must 
regularly appeal to short-sighted voters and thus face a strong incentive to mortgage the future for 
near-term benefits and to leave long-term problems to their successors.”); see also JONATHAN BOS-
TON, CTR. FOR ENVTL. POLICY, SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, AM. UNIV., GOVERNING FOR THE FUTURE: 
HOW TO BRING THE LONG-TERM INTO SHORT-TERM POLITICAL FOCUS 2 (2014), http://www.
american.edu/spa/cep/upload/jonathan-boston-lecture-american-university.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y9QP-T8B6]. 
 82 See BOSTON, supra note 81, at 2. 
 83 See id. 
 84 See Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, Remarks at OECD Forum 2008, Climate 
Change: A Matter of Political Will (June 3, 2008), http://www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/climate
changeamatterofpoliticalwill.htm [https://perma.cc/9CQ6-72YR]. 
 85 See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1320–21 (2003) (discussing this literature and arguing that it supports the 
institutionalization of a role for the precautionary principle in the climate change context). 
 86 Id. 
 87 For a comprehensive review, see the PEW CHARITABLE TR., A WIDENING GAP IN CITIES: 
SHORTFALLS IN FUNDING FOR PENSIONS AND RETIREE HEALTH CARE 1 (2013), http://www.pew
trusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/pewcitypensionsreportpdf.pdf [https://perma.
cc/C2YR-8SFU]. 
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to be highly motivating.88 Hence, the threat of liability may not motivate 
local leaders exactly where extra-political motivation to invest in adaptation 
is most needed: in localities where the threat of climate change effects is 
real but not so palpable that local politics already support adaptation in-
vestments.89 
B. Motivating the Wrong Kind of Adaptation: Liability as a Disincentive to 
Collaborative, “Light Footprint,” Experimental Adaptation 
In determining how to adapt to climate change and its effects, localities 
have a range of choices. Presumably, the kind of adaptation we want to in-
centivize is not necessarily adaptation that can easily be defended ex post in 
takings litigation: that is, concrete, highly visible, well-understood measures 
designed to protect property, as opposed to the measures that actually might 
have been more effective but that are less visible, less easily understood by 
lay people, less well-established, and hence less litigation-proof.90 In ex 
post litigation, collaborative adaptation efforts where a number of jurisdic-
tions rely on one another for disaster responses also may be more suscepti-
ble to second-guessing than adaptation programs where each locality acts as 
independently as possible. Thus, ex post, each government can document 
that its efforts were fully directed at its own citizens and their properties, 
even though collaboration would have been the most (or only) efficient ap-
proach to disaster preparedness. 
For example, imagine that a town is considering a range of measures to 
address flooding, including highly engineered, long used methods like sea 
walls, but also less well-established methods like dune replenishment and 
replanting of coastal scrub and coastal construction setbacks. From some 
perspectives, the reliance on sea walls might not be optimal, given that sea 
walls may simply displace water to other communities, ultimately may be 
counterproductive in terms of erosion, and can endanger wildlife.91 But, ex 
ante, local leaders may well think that a sea wall is arguably a better adapta-
                                                                                                                           
 88 See infra notes 111–119 and accompanying text. As discussed below, one advantage of 
requiring or inducing localities to carry third-party climate change insurance is that premiums are 
a current, certain cost and local leaders will be motivated to reduce premiums even if they general-
ly discount highly uncertain future costs. See infra notes 111–119 and accompanying text. 
 89 BOSTON, supra note 81, at 1–2, 4. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See What Causes Beach Erosion?, SCI. AM. (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.
com/article/what-causes-beach-erosion/ [https://perma.cc/5NH2-SY3P] (quoting an expert opining: 
“Bulkheads and seawalls may accelerate beach erosion by reflecting wave energy off the facing 
wall, impacting adjacent property owners as well . . . .”); Tricia Woolfenden, Sea Walls Designed 
to Save Beaches May Actually Speed Up Erosion, WLRN (Feb. 19, 2013), http://wlrn.org/post/
sea-walls-designed-save-beaches-may-actually-speed-erosion [https://perma.cc/9XCC-UZHV]. 
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tion measure to point to if they ever were to face takings litigation than a 
less readily understood and perhaps less-tested approach of using dunes and 
vegetation.92 In general, effective adaptation is ultimately going to require a 
degree of creativity and experimentation on the local level, but, ex post, 
creativity and experimentation may simply appear to be inadequate adapta-
tion. Therefore, ex ante, local leaders may adhere to methods they think 
could most readily be defended in litigation if takings claims based on inad-
equate adaptation are regarded as a realistic possibility.93 
C. Motivating Distributive Inequities: Liability as a Disincentive  
to Adaptation That Protects Lower-Value Properties  
and Their Inhabitants 
The overall governmental response to climate change and its effects 
involves difficult distributive choices, assuming, as one must, some limits 
on the available resources to address those effects.94 Government officials 
may need to make distributive choices within a given political jurisdiction 
as to which areas will receive the greatest protection from climate change 
effects and which areas will receive the least.95 In New York City, for ex-
ample, there may be questions as to what kinds of adaptive investments to 
protect against sea level rise to make in Manhattan as opposed to Brooklyn, 
or in some parts of Manhattan as opposed to others.96 The state, county, and 
city governments in Florida, a state dramatically threatened by climate 
change, also may face distributive choices about where resources should be 
concentrated to protect against the tides.97 Distributive choices and conse-
quences are also obviously in play when governments act to divert flood 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See What Causes Beach Erosion?, supra note 91; Woolfenden, supra note 91. 
 93 KELLY LEVIN ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., WORLD RESOURCES REPORT 2010–2011: DECI-
SION MAKING IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 124 (2011), http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/
world_resources_report_2010-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z79-2YUE] (discussing the limited re-
sources available to governments to combat climate change). 
 94 For a broad analysis of distributive fairness and climate change adaptation, see FAIRNESS 
IN ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE (W. Neal Adger et al. eds., 2006). 
 95 See id. at 240 (discussing distributive choices with regard to loss from climate change). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Even the question of how and what areas to save in Miami implicates difficult distributive 
questions. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, The Siege of Miami, NEW YORKER (Dec. 21 & 28, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/12/21/the-siege-of-miami [https://perma.cc/ZJ5H-AN3T]; 
Joe Romm, Scientist: ‘Miami, as We Know It Today, Is Doomed. It’s Not a Question of If. It’s a 
Question of When,’ CLIMATEPROGRESS (June 23, 2013, 12:40 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/
2013/06/23/2199031/scientist-miami-as-we-know-it-today-is-doomed-its-not-a-question-of-if-its-
a-question-of-when/ [https://perma.cc/7KZ9-V2Y8]; see also Justin Gillis, Rising Sea Levels Seen 
as Threat to Coastal U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/
science/earth/study-rising-sea-levels-a-risk-to-coastal-states.html. 
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waters or tides from one area to another; such diversions may occur within 
a single local jurisdiction, or, as suggested by the facts of Big Oak Farms, 
Inc. v. United States, across local jurisdictions.98 
Assuming that the relevant government actors are motivated to mini-
mize their liabilities, takings liability for inadequate or ineffective adapta-
tion or for improper diversion adaptation could skew government actors to 
favor wealthy areas in preference to less wealthy ones.99 Given the greater 
vulnerability of owners and residents of less wealthy areas, that may be ex-
actly the opposite of enlightened social policy.100 Consider a simple hypo-
thetical example. A locality has a budget of $1 million to invest in flood 
control protections. There is a wealthy part of the town and a poor part of 
the town, and the poor part actually faces greater flooding risk. But in the 
event of takings claims litigation for inadequate adaptation efforts, the po-
tential liabilities for property losses in the wealthy area would be several 
orders of magnitude greater than the potential liabilities for property losses 
in the poorer areas. As a result, local leaders might invest relatively more in 
flood control in the wealthier areas and relatively less in the poorer areas 
than they would have in the absence of possible takings liability. Or consid-
er a case like Big Oak Farms, Inc., in which the Corps is confronted with 
the choice of saving expensive farmland or saving a relatively impoverished 
town from flooding.101 The property claims by the farmers might exceed 
those by the residents of the small town, but the disruption to community 
life and wellbeing might be greater if the town were flooded. To avoid 
greater takings liability, one could imagine the Corps choosing to allow the 
town to be flooded even though, in the absence of such liability, it would 
have opted to divert the waters toward farmland. 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See 105 Fed. Cl. 48, 51–52 (2012); Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely 
Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 321, 362 (2005) (discussing Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085 (La. 2004), in which the 
Louisiana Supreme Court considered a takings claim following the state’s diversion of water from 
the Mississippi River over marshes used for oyster cultivation, allegedly to prevent erosion). 
 99 Larissa Pelham et al., Natural Disasters: What Is the Role for Social Safety Nets 8 (World 
Bank, SP Discussion Paper No. 1102, 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPRO-
TECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Safety-Nets-DP/1102.pdf [https://perma.cc/64JF-JPTK] 
(stating that historically, wealthy areas are less prone to natural disasters than poorer areas). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See Big Oak Farms, Inc., 105 Fed. Cl. at 51–52; see Pelham, supra note 99, at 8 (noting 
that poorer areas tend to be “more prone to natural disasters than wealthy areas”). 
300 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:281 
D. Takings Liability as an Incentive for Residents and Investors to Engage 
in Non-Adaptive Building and to Oppose  
Local Adaptation Efforts 
Just like local leaders, investors and property owners in areas at risk 
from climate change may simply discount future risks so much that their 
behavior is unaffected by those risks.102 But for many property owners, their 
property is a large part of their overall wealth, and standard economic anal-
ysis would assume risk aversion with respect to such a key asset. And for 
sophisticated investors and property owners with large portfolios, while we 
might assume they are not risk averse with respect to any give asset, we 
might think they would behave somewhat like the economically rational 
wealth-maximizer of classical economic theory and attend to how climate-
related risks could affect their wealth. Thus, there is good reason to suppose 
that investors and property owners in areas known to face climate-change-
related risks would sometimes, if not always, take those risks into account 
to some degree in their decision-making. 
And yet we know that people and corporations continue to build in ar-
eas at risk from flooding and rising tides, and that when they are allowed to, 
they sometimes build or maintain their structures in a way that does not mit-
igate the risk of water and wind damage.103 This behavior may not be as 
perplexing as it seems when we take two factors into account. First, national 
and state flood insurance programs provide full property coverage at premi-
ums that do not come close to reflecting the real flooding risks; insurance is 
also afforded structures that, in their current form and location, arguably 
should not be insurable at all.104 Second, even when property owners do not 
have flood insurance, they can sometimes receive reconstruction and repair 
funding through state and federal programs, including the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA)’s post-disaster Individual Assistance 
program.105 It is not a requirement for receiving Individual Assistance that 
the structure had been adequately insured through government or private 
insurance.106 Thus, government policy acts to invite people and corporations 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See Howard Kunreuther et al., Overcoming Decision Bias to Reduce Losses from Natural 
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to—rationally, from their perspective—overinvest in areas at risk from cli-
mate change and underinvest in adaptive building and rebuilding. 
A change in takings doctrine to allow takings claims for inaction or in-
adequate or ineffective adaptation would only add to the moral hazard prob-
lem created by current government programs.107 If investors knew that they 
could bring takings claims when their buildings were damaged from flood 
or fire based on government inaction or inadequate action, that would re-
duce their incentive to avoid or mitigate the risk in the first place.108 The 
Takings Clause would provide a source of insurance—free insurance—on 
top of the insurance in the form of federally or state subsidized insurance 
and ex post disaster aid.109 Because we might suppose that an understanding 
of the Takings Clause and an ability to litigate effectively generally will 
correlate with wealth and sophistication, we might anticipate that the possi-
bility of bringing Takings Clause claims would in particular encourage larg-
er, wealthier investors to take on more climate-related risk and invest less in 
mitigating that risk through adaptive building and rebuilding. 
Moreover, the possibility of Takings Clause liability for inaction or in-
adequate action might encourage some investors and property owners to 
lobby local leaders against adopting climate change adaption measures that 
would limit the property owners’ and investors’ building plans or otherwise 
cost them money in the form of higher fees or taxes. Consider, for example, 
a company that owns undeveloped coastal property and that would like to 
build a resort and hotel there. The locality, let us assume, is considering 
adopting a plan for coastal protections against flooding that would cost mil-
lions of dollars in new taxes. In the absence of possible Takings Clause lia-
bility for inadequate adaptation, the company might support the coastal pro-
tection plan and the tax increases, even though the tax increases would re-
duce its near term return on its investment. But if the company knows that it 
could sue the town in the event that the town did not invest in coastal pro-
tection and flooding damaged its property, the company might conclude that 
the profit-maximizing strategy would be to lobby against the coastal protec-
tion plan and tax increase, or at least not to push for its adoption. In sum, 
the possibility of takings claims for inaction or inadequate adaptation might 
alter local political economy to make inaction or inadequate adaptation, at 
least on the margin, more likely. 
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III. OUR CURRENT INSURANCE REGIME, WHY IT IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, 
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 
As explained above, using the threat of takings liability for the failure 
to adapt, or adapt adequately, to climate change would not produce the de-
sired incentives.110 But if the idea of Takings Clause liability for non-
adaptation or ineffective adaptation to climate change by local governments 
is not sound social policy, the idea does bring into focus a real problem, 
namely, how can local officials be encouraged to engage in adaptation when 
their own judgment and local politics otherwise would not provide enough 
motivation? 
One possible approach to encourage localities to invest in climate 
change adaptation would be to incentivize them to purchase private insur-
ance against the effects of climate change—in the form of insurance for 
damages due to wind, flooding, and fire, notably—as regards property and 
infrastructure owned and operated by the locality and affiliated public enti-
ties, such as government buildings, bridges, roads, water collection distribu-
tion facilities, and electric power facilities.111 There are several ways in 
which such insurance could incentivize climate change adaptation.112 
First, private insurers would require insured localities to pay premi-
ums, and they presumably would require higher premiums from localities 
and for facilities in localities that seemed to have the greatest exposure to 
climate-related flooding and other climate-related effects.113 To garner a 
lower premium, localities might be willing to make improvements at facili-
ties or take other measures that would reduce risk, such as building or modi-
fying buildings to protect them against possible water damage, in much the 
same way that a car owner might install safety devices or alarms in his or 
her car to qualify for a lower premium. 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See supra notes 68–109 and accompanying text. 
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For their part, insurers might play a role in studying and effectively 
disseminating information regarding what measures would reduce risk.114 It 
would be rational for insurers of municipalities to support efforts to identify 
and promote means of reducing climate-related risks, because the better and 
greater the adaptation, the lower the potential insurance proceeds outlays 
would be.115 
Insurance, even when insurers do not offer advice as to how to lessen 
risk or offer premium reductions for risk mitigation, also may have a psy-
chological effect by making certain risks more salient to municipal deci-
sion-makers. As a result, local officials may be more open to considering 
measures to address those risks. One might imagine that paying terrorism 
insurance premiums cannot but help focus one on the possible risk of terror-
ism—a risk that might not seem salient if one never had any direct contact 
with terrorism. Similarly, paying climate-change-related insurance for pub-
lic infrastructure, in and of itself, may lead municipal officials to think 
about climate change risks that they simply would not think about other-
wise, and/or to be less prone to dismiss such risks as too uncertain to war-
rant any attention.116 
Moreover, even in contexts where it is infeasible for localities to re-
duce risk through adaptive improvements so that they cannot lower the 
premiums they must pay, the premiums might have the function of making 
the costs of government operation and hence (presumably) taxes relatively 
higher in those areas where risks from climate change would seem to be 
greatest, and relatively lower elsewhere.117 Thus, insurance premiums will 
tend to make investment relatively more expensive where climate change 
risks are greater, and thus might have the climate-change-adaptive effect of 
discouraging development in those areas at greatest risk from flooding and 
other climate change effects.118 Municipal insurance, in other words, would 
promote allocative efficiency in the era of climate change.119 
This Part first details what we do and do not know about municipal in-
surance practices.120 It then reviews the Federal Emergency Management 
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Agency (FEMA) Pubic Assistance program and argues that it effectively 
discourages the purchase of private insurance related to climate change ef-
fects and hence also discourages, at least to a degree, adaptation.121 The Part 
then proposes two reforms: one admittedly politically unrealistic, which is a 
legal mandate that localities purchase flood and other relevant insurance in 
coastal areas and other areas broadly at some risk from climate-related ef-
fects; and one perhaps more politically realistic, that FEMA post-disaster 
public assistance to localities and/or federal flood insurance for individual 
owners be conditioned on localities’ having privately and very adequately 
insured public buildings and infrastructure.122 Finally, this Part considers 
some objections to the approach of greater reliance on private insurance to 
incentivize adaptation by local governments.123 
A. Municipal Insurance Practices and FEMA Policies 
There is not a great deal known about the practices of municipalities in 
insuring against risks as a general matter. As Professor Serkin notes, munic-
ipal insurance is not well studied, perhaps because it sounds like a dry sub-
ject.124 It is also likely the case that localities vary a great deal in their ap-
proach to insurance, so making generalizations is difficult. 
What we do know is that municipalities do insure against at least some 
kinds of risks, especially tort liability risks.125 Private insurance is available 
from traditional private insurance companies. In many states, localities have 
joined together to form insurance pools that operate, in effect, like third-
party insurers with respect to their individual municipal members.126 And 
some municipalities, especially larger ones, purport to self-insure against 
risks, either using explicit reserve funds or through less formalized ar-
rangements.127 
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The risks most obviously posed by climate change—flooding risk and 
wind/hail damage risks in coastal areas—are not part of standard property 
insurance policies at all or are subject to high, percentage-based deducti-
bles.128 It seems likely that many municipalities do not purchase enough, or 
any, special insurance that would address flood and wind damage to public 
property and infrastructure. There is notably an absence of information 
available on the internet and web pages of major insurance companies re-
garding private flood insurance for public entities and governments. For its 
part, the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) has no special insur-
ance program geared toward public infrastructure, and there is no evidence 
that localities do seek to purchase flood insurance as part of the NFIP com-
mercial building insurance program. 
The Emmett Center policy paper notes that “many municipalities self-
insure” against the risks relevant to climate change, but it does not provide 
any data regarding how many municipalities self-insure against such risks, 
or how adequately they do so.129 Most adaptation plans from major cities 
contain no discussion of insurance; one notable exception, Boston’s adapta-
tion plan, does call for self-insuring against the possible effects of climate 
change by setting money aside for that purpose.130 And it may be that other 
self-insuring cities are also setting aside money for climate-change-related 
risks. But even if this is true, it is unclear what self-insurance really means 
in particular cases, absent an explanation of how cities calculate the 
amounts that must be reserved for such self-insurance, how those amounts 
can be held secure and available for later use, or how the self-insurance is to 
be administered.131 Self-insurance only works when there are safeguards 
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from having the self-insurance fund tapped to meet more pressing, immedi-
ate needs, and of course many localities have pressing, immediate needs. 
Politicians—and not just local ones—may have a tendency to put the im-
mediate need over the less immediate risk when push (and politics) comes 
to shove.132 As one commentator explained: 
Everyone always has good intentions from the get-go, but the 
question is, do you have the discipline? . . . . It’s a minority of 
towns that it’s actually an option for. You have to be big, you 
have to have an appetite for risk, you have to have good controls 
in place and you have to have the discipline.133 
To the extent that localities do not currently insure adequately against 
climate-related risks, one reason may be that the federal government affirm-
atively creates a disincentive for them to do so.134 FEMA’s public assistance 
program discourages the purchase of adequate private insurance by provid-
ing federal funding to state and local governments for climate-related dam-
ages with few strings attached.135 In effect, the federal government provides 
free insurance in the form of ex post federal aid, which cannot but reduce 
the ex ante incentive of localities to purchase insurance.136 
Pursuant to the Stafford Act, FEMA provides supplemental assistance 
for state and local government recovery expenses connected to natural dis-
asters and guarantees that the federal share will be at least seventy-five per-
cent.137 A state may request, and the President has often granted, a higher 
federal cost share when a disaster has had a significant impact on that 
state.138 FEMA must reduce all project grants by the amount of actual pri-
vate insurance proceeds received by the state or locality.139 FEMA, howev-
er, does not require that a state or locality carry insurance against a particu-
lar risk and particular facility to qualify for disaster assistance.140 Only if 
you have received “over $5,000 in damages to any insurable facility” will 
“FEMA . . . require you to obtain and maintain insurance coverage on that 
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facility as a condition of receiving disaster assistance.”141 But even then, the 
insurance required need only cover the hazard and the dollar amount of 
damage for which disaster assistance was received.142 There is no general 
requirement that a locality carry comprehensive and adequate flood or wind 
insurance for all its insurable property and infrastructure.143 
FEMA public assistance (“PA”) can be used to address a range of ex-
penses incurred as a result of flooding and/or extreme weather.144 PA pro-
vides funding to grantees for the repair and restoration of damaged public 
and eligible private nonprofit facilities, for emergency measures taken to 
protect lives and property, and in support of disaster-related debris remov-
al.145 When PA is authorized, such assistance may be provided for Debris 
Removal; Emergency Protective Measures; Repair of Roads and Bridges; 
Water Control Facilities; Public Buildings; Public Utilities; and Other Facil-
ities.146 The prerequisite for a locality obtaining PA (or individuals obtain-
ing individual assistance (“IA”)) is that the locality falls within an area des-
ignated as a major disaster or emergency area.147 A state governor must re-
quest a declaration that areas within his or her state are natural disaster or 
emergency areas, and, in theory, the declaration decision rests with the Pres-
ident’s discretion.148 In practice, decisions about PA are channeled through 
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FEMA and based on the level of state resources available to meet the dam-
ages caused by the natural disaster at issue.149 
While there is variation in the number of declarations per year, the av-
erage number in recent years has been sixty, excluding pure emergency and 
fire emergency declarations (which also allow for the payment of PA and 
IA).150 In 2011, there were ninety-nine declarations. Many of the declara-
tions relate to the sort of natural disasters associated with climate change, 
notably flooding and severe storm damage.151 For example, in 2014, forty-
four of eighty-four declarations have involved flooding, and in part of 2015, 
forty of the seventy-seven declarations involved flooding, according to 
FEMA.152 
It is not easy to calculate the exact amount expended yearly on PA to 
localities because FEMA often bundles individual and public assistance fig-
ures. But the numbers are clearly substantial.153 According to my best esti-
mate, FEMA provided over $15.8 billion in 1996, $19.4 billion in 2005, 
$12.7 billion in 2012, and $5.9 billion in 2013 in PA funds for eligible pro-
jects.154 In addition, the federal government allocates additional funding for 
high-profile disasters, such as Hurricane Sandy, as well as some smaller 
incidents, and states also provide natural-disaster-related assistance to local-
                                                                                                                           
 149 42 USC § 5170 (2012) (broadly defining a disaster qualifying for relief as one of “such 
severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the af-
fected local governments”); BROWN & RICHARDSON, supra note 146, at 1; FEMA FAQ, supra note 
137; see also FRANCIS X. MCCARTHY, CONG. RES. SERV., FEMA’S DISASTER DECLARATION 
PROCESS: A PRIMER 3 (2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43784.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AT4T-QBKY] (describing the process for a request for an emergency declaration and 
indicating that assistance depends on a finding that the severity and magnitude of the damage is 
beyond the capabilities of the state). 
 150 ERWANN MICHEL-KERJAN, WHARTON RISK CTR., RETHINKING GOVERNMENT DISASTER 
RELIEF IN THE U.S.: EVIDENCE AND A WAY FORWARD 1, 3 (2015), http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/
risk/conference/pprs/Michel-Kerjan_Rethinking-Disaster-Relief.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMG4-KBBL]. 
 151 Id. 
 152 The relevant data is available from Disaster Declarations, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. 
AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/disasters [https://perma.cc/7PQC-93TQ]. 
 153 Federal Emergency Management Agency Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2015: Hear-
ing Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security 2–3 (2014) 
(statement of Greg Fugate, Administrator, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency), http://www.fema.
gov/media-library-data/1395864288969-5e9a4384875452d1ba0cd6871776b8be/3-26-14_The%20
Federal%20Emergency%20Management%20Agencys%20Budget%20Submission%20for%20Fiscal
%20Year%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BKD-7YA9] (indicating that in 2013, FEMA provided 
over $5.9 billion in public assistance). Additional data was derived from compiling PA project 
funding per project per year as reported at FEMA Public Assistance Funded Projects Summary—
Open Government Initiative, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/documents/28344 [https://perma.cc/F458-KPP4]. 
 154 See generally Public Assistance Funded Projects Summary—Open Government Initiative, 
supra note 153 (providing relevant data). 
2016] Incentivizing Municipalities to Adapt to Climate Change 309 
ities.155 For large disasters, PA may only account for a modest fraction of 
payments to localities. 
There is no direct evidence that local leaders consciously forego wind, 
flood, or other insurance for public property and infrastructure in part be-
cause they know federal (and state) funding will be forthcoming in the 
event of major flooding or a severe storm. But given how well-entrenched 
our regime of federal funding for major disasters is, it is plausible that the 
availability of such ex post aid figures into their thinking, at least to the ex-
tent that they realistically focus on the threat of climate-related flooding and 
extreme weather. 
The Heritage Foundation has come closest to a moral hazard critique 
of the Public Assistance Program, which it criticizes as part of the over-
federalization of disaster preparedness and response in the United States.156 
The Heritage Foundation has called for decreasing the share for Public As-
sistance below seventy-five percent, and for reducing the discretion on the 
part of the federal government to exceed the default share of federal fund-
ing.157 But Heritage has not addressed the role private insurance should or 
could play in addressing the incentives for localities created by PA.158 As 
suggested below, increasing the state and local share of recovery funding 
would not be as effective as requiring more adequate insurance because, ex 
ante, a higher share requirement would not introduce pressure from a third 
party (private insurers) to engage in risk mitigation. Additionally, ex post, a 
state or locality could always claim that it thought it had reserved enough 
funding to meet its ex post share, but that it does not in fact have enough 
money. It would be very difficult, as a political matter, for the federal gov-
ernment to refuse to assume funding for what should have been the state’s 
share. 
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B. Possible Reforms 
Assuming that it would be productive in terms of climate adaptation 
for localities to carry private insurance, and that, without prompting, most 
will not, what are the possibilities for changing the status quo? For such 
insurance to work, localities with a range of risk exposures would need to 
insure; otherwise, insurance could never be profitable, as only those at risk 
would select insurance, and they would be the ones most apt to have large 
claims.159 Moreover, because the effects of climate change ultimately will 
be broad, there are benefits in incentivizing adaptation even among those 
localities that are not at the most immediate, identifiable risk.160 Thus the 
question, slightly refined, is: what are the possibilities for changing the sta-
tus quo such that most or all coastal localities and localities in flood plains 
and otherwise vulnerable areas seek insurance? 
One approach would be for Congress to outright mandate such insur-
ance coverage, but that would be widely regarded as an unacceptable intru-
sion by the federal government into a traditional state regulatory domain 
(insurance) and would have no political traction.161 For their part, states 
could require localities in floodplains and coastal areas and otherwise vul-
nerable locations to carry property insurance that protected their property 
and infrastructure from flooding and wind damage. A state-by-state ap-
proach, however, would require gaining political support for the reform in 
many separate jurisdictions. And, in many states, there is a strong tradition 
of deference to localities in the management of their affairs, and, increasing-
ly, of reliance on the federal government to cover disaster-related expens-
es.162 Overall, this approach would be at best slow and quite possibly alto-
gether infeasible. 
Another possibility would be to tie an insurance mandate to federal 
benefits. The most direct approach here would be to require that any locality 
that is eligible for FEMA PA to carry adequate flood and wind insurance for 
damage if the locality is in a coastal area, floodplain, or other vulnerable 
area. To the extent localities took this requirement seriously and did not be-
                                                                                                                           
 159 Heal & Kunreuther, supra note 13, at 235–45 (discussing the impact from large claims on 
private insurer profitability). 
 160 See Climate Change Impacts, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/
impacts/ [https://perma.cc/SHG9-Y2TY] (detailing the broad effects of climate change). 
 161 See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 99 (1959) (holding that 
the insurance industry is the regulatory domain of the states). 
 162 See, e.g., Tonya Adamski et al., FEMA Reorganization and the Response to Hurricane 
Disaster Relief, 2006 PERSP. IN PUB. AFF. 3, 3 (discussing the states’ reliance on the federal gov-
ernment during natural disasters); Jeanne-Marie Col, Managing Disasters: The Role of Local 
Government, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 114, 114 (2007) (discussing state deference to local authorities 
with regard to disaster relief). 
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lieve that they would receive aid even if they failed to obtain insurance and 
to the extent that the local leaders perceived any risk of needing PA funds 
after a natural disaster, this requirement could be a powerful incentive.163 
Even for local leaders who might not take concerted action to address cli-
mate-change-related effects, if left to their own devices, perhaps because 
they discounted future uncertain risks heavily, affirmatively making the 
choice to render their locality formally ineligible for PA might be a difficult 
choice to publically defend, and hence one they would not want to make. 
From the perspective of the federal government, and Congress in partic-
ular, an insurance requirement tied to PA eligibility arguably would be appeal-
ing because it might constrain total federal outlays, thereby making more 
money available for other federal projects of interest to members of Con-
gress.164 There has, in fact, been concern and debate in Congress about FE-
MA spending.165 And while there is a strong tradition of federal deference to 
state and local government control over local affairs,166 there is also a strong 
tradition of federal conditions on federal aid. 
Another possible approach to an insurance requirement would be to tie 
a locality having insured its property and infrastructure adequately to the 
availability of national flood insurance for individual private property own-
ers in the locality. Under FEMA regulations, a locality’s individual property 
owners qualify for national flood insurance if their locality adopts a flood-
plain management ordinance that meets FEMA’s minimum standards.167 As 
FEMA explains: 
Joining the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is an im-
portant step toward reducing a community’s risk of flooding and 
making a speedier, more sustained recovery should flooding occur. 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Adamski et al., supra note 162, at 3 (discussing how the safety net of federal aid can 
affect a locality’s incentive to obtain insurance). 
 164 U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES 27 (1995), 
http://ota.fas.org/reports/9536.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FUD-FM6A] (describing the argument that 
increased investment in disaster mitigation would save the federal government money that would 
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 165 Brian Koenig, Hurricane Sandy Sparks Debate Over FEMA Budget Cuts, NEW AM. (Oct. 
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 166 See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, CONGRESSIONAL 
PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS 11 (2006), http://www.precaution.org/lib/06/
federal_preemption.060606.pdf [https://perma.cc/36AE-EGNM] (discussing the federal govern-
ment’s traditional deference to state and local governments on environmental and land use deci-
sions). 
 167 Floodplain Management Information for Communities, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
https://www.fema.gov/floodplain-management-information-communities [https://perma.cc/TKU4-
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It also allows property owners within a participating community to 
purchase NFIP flood insurance . . . . [M]ore than 22,000 communi-
ties have already agreed to adopt and enforce floodplain manage-
ment ordinances that provide flood-loss reduction building stand-
ards for new and existing development.168 
FEMA’s requirements for a satisfactory ordinance are not particularly de-
manding, but they do provide a precedent for conditioning access to the 
NFIP for individual property owners on a locality obtaining fully adequate 
private insurance for its insurance and infrastructure.169 
C. Objections 
1. The Market Cannot and Will Not Fully Insure Localities at Risk 
One potential objection to this proposal for greater private insurance of 
local government property and infrastructure against flood and similar risks 
is that private insurers will refuse to write such insurance and participate in 
that market. Notably, private insurers in recent years have been withdrawing 
from the private property flood insurance market in some parts of the coun-
try at greatest climatic risk, out of fear of huge claims liability.170 If that is 
the case, why would we anticipate that private insurers would cover public 
property and infrastructure on a much larger scale than they currently do, 
and in particular, in those localities facing greatest risks of flooding and 
other climate-related effects? 
In fact, there are reasonable reasons for hesitance on the part of private 
insurers, as commentators have explained in discussing the obstacles to ex-
panding private flood insurance for private property.171 For one thing, insur-
                                                                                                                           
 168 Id. 
 169 Reforming the NFIP overall to make the program more realistic in pricing risk has proven 
extremely difficult for Congress, in part because of the pushback from property owners who 
would lose insurance or need to pay much more. But adding an insurance requirement for locali-
ties as part of the NFIP would be a much smaller reform and would not generally mobilize proper-
ty owners in coastal areas and floodplains. It thus might well be a place to start from, although 
certainly it would only be a start. Until NFIP pricing and practices are reformed, it would be more 
useful to have localities insure through private insurers rather than through the NFIP. 
 170 See, e.g., Paige St. John, State Farm Leaving Flood Insurance Program, HERALD-TRIB. 
(June 3, 2010), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20100604/ARTICLE/6041050?p=2&tc=pg 
[https://perma.cc/BVF3-R9FD] (explaining that State Farm decided not to write or administer its 
own federal flood insurance policies). 
 171 See generally Erwann Michel-Kerjan et al., Could Flood Insurance Be Privatised in the 
United States? A Primer, 40 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 179 (2015) (arguing, separately, 
that the technology exists to model flood risk, that private flood insurance is available outside the 
United States, and that reinsurance has been used in other contexts within the United States to 
facilitate private insurance markets). 
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ers prefer to set rates based on a large data set from which they can accu-
rately estimate future claims. In the context of extreme weather and flood-
ing, accurate data is difficult to come by, in part because of inadequate data 
collection and assessment by government, but also because there is a lim-
ited but highly variable number of storm events per year and the effect of 
climate change in the near term is very hard to accurately factor into any 
model.172 Moreover, insurers are traditionally conservative in the sense that 
they do not want to risk being unable to pay claims and face possible bank-
ruptcy, and the nature of extreme weather and flooding is such that there is 
always a possibility of a year with extraordinarily large claims that would 
exhaust the insurer’s financial capacity.173 Moreover, insurers are heavily 
regulated by state authorities and may be justifiably concerned that state 
regulators will not allow them to charge the rates they believe are necessary, 
or to deny such insurance altogether once they have entered the market.174 
These concerns notwithstanding, there is good reason to think that pri-
vate insurers would expand their coverage to encompass a large number of 
localities’ properties if there were market demand for such insurance—and, 
of course, there would be market demand if there were a legal mandate or 
strong legal incentives for localities to obtain such insurance. Modelling of 
flood and other risks has improved to the point that realistic premiums can 
now be estimated.175 Insurance markets and products that were thought to 
be economically infeasible or impractical have in fact been developed once 
market demand materialized for one reason or another.176 The insurance 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See Mindy Lubber, Extreme Weather Can’t ‘Surprise’ Insurance Companies, CLIMATE 
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 174 LOU ET AL., supra note 10, at 17. 
 175 See Michel-Kerjan et al., supra note 171, at 181. 
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A. Cohen et al., Deepwater Drilling: Law, Policy, and Economics of Firm Organization and Safe-
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Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2761 (2012). There was talk then of the insurance market being 
unable to produce the coverage needed to meet this mandate. But that has not been the case. Ra-
ther, the insurance industry worldwide has produced $1.5 billion in capacity to cover offshore 
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industry has a long history of creativity and innovation when there is a mar-
ket opportunity.177 
Having said that, private insurance for localities might be facilitated by 
a government promise to insure the localities that have too high risk a pro-
file or lack the financial ability to cover insurance premiums, although such 
coverage should come with strict qualification requirements and safeguards 
so that the moral-hazard-reducing benefits of an insurance requirement are 
not subverted. The federal government could also ease insurer concerns by 
a government guarantee of reinsurance to backstop private insurers against 
unusually great claims liability in a given year, or by trying to locate private 
investors willing to assume the reinsurance risk. In general, the federal gov-
ernment could support and facilitate expansion of private insurance for lo-
calities in the same ways that the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) and others have suggested the federal government could, in theo-
ry, support expansion of private insurance for private property owners.178 
2. Insurers Will Not Promote Adaptation 
Another concern is that even if private insurers do insure localities 
against flood and wind risks and the like, the insurers will not encourage 
risk mitigation by insureds and financially encourage insureds to engage in 
greater risk mitigation. And, in fact, we do not have much direct evidence 
that insurers will encourage risk mitigation in the flood and storm context. 
Several of the examples of mitigation programs associated with insurance in 
the United States have originated with state governments and not private 
                                                                                                                           
drilling. BOOZ, ALLEN & HAMILTON, THE OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY REPORT IN INSUR-
ANCE—PART ONE 5 (2010) [https://perma.cc/WV27-AXNS] (original hyperlink no longer active). 
 177 See Cohen et al., supra note 176, at 1901. 
 178 The GAO identified the following as means to facilitate private insurance for flooding: 
The federal government could also encourage private sector involvement by provid-
ing coverage for the highest-risk properties that the private sector is unwilling to in-
sure. Providing residual coverage could increase the program’s exposure relative to 
the number of properties it insured, but NFIP would be insuring fewer properties, 
and charging adequate rates could reduce taxpayer costs . . . . [O]ther strategies in-
clude[e] NFIP purchasing reinsurance from the private sector rather than borrowing 
from the U.S. Treasury, and NFIP issuing catastrophe bonds to transfer risk to pri-
vate investors. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 173, at 17–24; see also Kimberly Tallon, Flood 
Insurance Presents Opportunity, Obstacles for Private Insurers, MYNEWMARKETS.COM (Apr. 
29, 2014), http://www.mynewmarkets.com/articles/182169/flood-insurance-presents-opportunity-
obstacles-for-private-insurers [https://perma.cc/NHR9-C36T]. 
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insurers.179 There is mixed evidence as to whether private flood insurers in 
Germany encourage risk mitigation, and the relevance of the German expe-
rience to the United States is debatable.180 
Outside the context of private flood and similar insurance for which 
we have limited or no relevant evidence, however, there is ample evidence 
of insurers encouraging risk mitigation by insureds.181 As Omri Ben-Shahar 
and Kyle Logue argue, insurance is a market-based means of ex ante regula-
tion of risk that is largely taken for granted in such fields as automobile 
safety, workplace safety, and household safety.182 As they explain, “work-
place safety is regulated at least as much by workers’ compensation liability 
insurers as it is by Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(“OSHA”) regulators; and household safety is regulated as much, if not 
more, by homeowners’ insurance than it is by municipal regulators.”183 As 
Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther, and Matthew White document, there was a 
dramatic decline in leaks from underground fuel tanks in certain states when 
those states required gas stations to carry private clean-up and liability in-
surance.168 They explain that “the price structure for market-based insurance 
gives tank owners economic incentives to invest in equipment that reduces 
the chance of accidental fuel tank leaks.”184 Environmental liability insurers 
outside oil and gas offer discounts for firms that implement environmental 
management systems that help detect and address possible risks and that 
                                                                                                                           
 179 Massachusetts’ backstop property insurer implemented a program that reduced or removed 
windstorm or hail deductibles for policyholders, while concurrently providing premium relief and 
taking steps to limit wind damage in the event of storms. See LOU ET AL., supra note 10, at 10 
(describing the Massachusetts program). Florida has required insurers to provide reductions in 
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 180 See Annegret Thieken et al., Insurability and Mitigation of Food Losses in Private House-
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 183 Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 182, at 199, 202, 211. 
 184 See Haitao Yin et al., Does Private Insurance Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 2012 
REG. 36, 37, http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/J2012Summer_Regulation_HY-HK-MW_
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also cumulatively generate firm knowledge as to actual conditions on the 
ground and possible means of operational improvement.185 
If it is true that insurers generally do promote risk mitigation for their 
own financial interests, the question becomes: is there any reason they 
should act differently in the context of flood and similar insurance for local-
ities’ properties? One explanation that has been set forth in the context of 
private flood insurance of private properties relates to the length of the term 
of the insurance contract and whether the insurance contract attaches to the 
owner/payer or to the property itself.186 Insurance contracts and rates are 
typically set on an annual basis, and possibly they must be under current 
state insurance regulation.187 Moreover, the available data suggest that in-
sureds in many cases only maintain a flood insurance policy for a single 
year.188 For an insurer, however, there is very little to be gained by investing 
in promoting mitigation for flooding and similar risks with regard to a prop-
erty if that policy only lasts one year, as the risk of flooding in any given 
single year is quite small. If a contract were extended to a 5- to 10-year 
term, the incentive for investing in a risk mitigation program presumably 
would increase substantially. For their part, insureds also may lack an ade-
quate incentive to invest in risk mitigation if they think that their policy 
may be changed, or their rate structure reset, after only a single year. With a 
long-term policy, any premium abatement or other incentive would be guar-
anteed over the period of the long-term policy and would thus be much 
more meaningful for the insured. In sum, with the move to longer-term pol-
icies, there is a very reasonable conceptual basis for thinking that insureds 
will promote risk mitigation by localities. 
Moreover, because any effort to increase reliance on private insurance 
would be achieved through statutory and regulatory initiatives and pro-
grammatic changes, rather than a change in constitutional doctrine such as 
takings doctrine, it should be possible for government to experiment and 
observe whether private insurers helpfully promote risk mitigation and, if 
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they do not, adjust regulatory requirements accordingly.189 Undoing chang-
es to constitutional doctrine are, by contrast, not readily or quickly 
achieved, which is another reason why takings doctrine should not be em-
ployed as the vehicle to incentivize greater government adaptation efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
Climate change adaptation is essential for the United States, as climate 
change and its effects are, to an extent, inevitable. The sea will rise and ex-
treme weather will become more commonplace even if the nations of the 
world, collectively, are able to reduce their current annual emissions of 
greenhouse gasses. Local governments and local officials will need to play 
a key role in climate change adaptation, and hence it is important that they 
are properly incentivized to do so. But reconfiguring traditional Takings 
Clause doctrine to allow takings claims for inaction, inadequate/ineffective 
adaptation, improper diversion of floodwaters, and the like would not create 
the right incentives for local officials or investor/property owners, and in-
deed could be highly counterproductive. By contrast, FEMA reform to pro-
mote greater reliance on private insurance offers the promise of encourag-
ing adaptation without creating counterproductive incentives or destabiliz-
ing established constitutional law doctrine. 
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enrich private insurers at the expense of localities. Insurers will require that they not only are pro-
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